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This paper proposes a methodology for measuring credit booms and uses it to identify credit booms
in emerging and industrial economies over the past four decades. In addition, we use event study methods
to identify the key empirical regularities of credit booms in macroeconomic aggregates and micro-level
data. Macro data show a systematic relationship between credit booms and economic expansions, rising
asset prices, real appreciations, widening external deficits and managed exchange rates. Micro data
show a strong association between credit booms and firm-level measures of leverage, firm values,
and external financing, and bank-level indicators of banking fragility. Credit booms in industrial and
emerging economies show three major differences: (1) credit booms and the macro and micro fluctuations
associated with them are larger in emerging economies, particularly in the nontradables sector; (2)
not all credit booms end in financial crises, but most emerging markets crises were associated with
credit booms; and (3) credit booms in emerging economies are often preceded by large capital inflows















Episodes in which credit to the private sector rises significantly above its long-run 
trend (i.e. “credit booms”) are often associated with periods of economic turbulence. To 
date, however, efforts at developing methodologies for identifying credit booms and 
characterizing the economic fluctuations that accompany them have produced mixed 
results. In addition, little is known about the association between economy-wide credit 
booms and the financial conditions of individual firms and banks, and about whether the 
characteristics of credit booms differ across industrial and emerging economies. 
In this paper, we propose a “thresholds method” for identifying credit booms, and 
implement it to study the microeconomic and macroeconomic characteristics of credit 
booms in industrial and emerging economies. This method splits real credit per capita in 
each country into its cyclical and trend components, and identifies a credit boom as an 
episode in which credit exceeds its long-run trend by more than a given “boom” 
threshold, with the duration of the boom set by “starting” and “ending” thresholds. A key 
feature of this method is that boom and duration thresholds are proportional to each 
country’s standard deviation of credit over the business cycle. Hence, credit booms 
reflect country-specific “unusually large” cyclical credit expansions. 
We apply our method to data for 48 countries over the 1960-2006 period and find 27 
credit booms in industrial countries and 22 in emerging economies. We then take the 
peak dates of these booms and construct seven-year event windows around them to 
examine the dynamics of macro aggregates and firm- and bank-level financial indicators 
during credit booms. The results show that credit booms are associated with periods of 
economic expansion, rising equity and housing prices, real appreciation and widening   2
external deficits in the build-up phase of the booms, followed by the opposite dynamics 
in the downswing. Credit booms also feature similar pro-cyclical movements in firm-
level indicators of leverage, firm values, and use of external financing, and in bank-level 
indicators of credit issuance and asset returns. The banks’ ratios of capital adequacy and 
non-performing loans show the opposite pattern (rising in the upswing and falling in the 
aftermath). Moreover, credit booms tend to be synchronized internationally and centered 
on “big events” like the 1980s debt crisis, the 1992 ERM crisis, and the 1990s Sudden 
Stops in emerging economies. In addition, splitting our sample into financial crisis vs. 
non-crisis cases, we find that booms in the crisis group were larger. 
Credit booms in industrial and emerging economies differ in three key respects: First, 
the fluctuations that macro aggregates and micro indicators display during credit booms 
are larger, more persistent, and asymmetric in emerging economies, and this pattern is 
particularly strong in the nontradables sector. Second, not all credit booms end in crisis, 
but many of the recent emerging market crises were associated with credit booms. Third, 
the frequency of credit booms in emerging markets is higher when preceded by periods of 
large capital inflows but not when preceded by domestic financial reforms or gains in 
total factor productivity (TFP), while industrial countries show the opposite pattern 
(credit booms are more frequent after periods of high TFP or financial reforms, and less 
frequent after large capital inflows). In contrast, credit booms in both industrial and 
emerging economies are far more frequent in the presence of fixed or managed exchange 
rates, than under floating or dirty floating regimes. 
Our work is related to the empirical literature that identifies booms in macro variables 
using threshold methods and event-study techniques. Montiel’s (2000) analysis of   3
consumption booms was one of the first studies in this vein. Gourinchas, Valdes, and 
Landerretche (2001), henceforth GVL, introduced threshold methods to the analysis of 
credit booms, followed by several recent studies including Cottarelli, et. al. (2003), 
International Monetary Fund (2004), Hilberts, et. al. (2005), and Ottens, et. al. (2005).
1 
The majority of these studies measure credit booms using GVL’s method. There are 
three important differences between their method and the one we propose in this paper: 
(1) we use real credit per capita instead of the credit-output ratio as the measure of credit; 
(2) we construct the trend of credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter in its standard 
form, instead of using an “expanding HP trend” (see Section 2 for details); and (3) we use 
thresholds that depend on each country’s cyclical variability of credit, instead of a 
threshold common to all countries.
2 
These differences have major quantitative implications. An example of both methods 
applied to Chilean data shows that the GVL method is not robust to the choice of credit 
measure, and that it treats each period’s credit observation as unduly representative of its 
trend (because it models the long-run trend of credit as a smoothed, lagged approximation 
of the actual data). Moreover, the two methods yield sharply different predictions about 
the association between macro variables and credit booms. In particular, we find that 
output, consumption and investment rise significantly above trend during the 
expansionary phase of credit booms, and fall below trend during the contractionary 
phase. In contrast, GVL found weak evidence of cycles in output and absorption 
associated with credit booms. We also find a clear association between credit booms and 
                                                 
1 Other studies examine linkages between credit and macro variables without measuring credit booms (for 
example Collyns and Senhadji (2002), Borio, et. al. (2001), and Kraft and Jankov (2005)). 
2 Our study also differs from GVL’s in that we examine credit booms in industrial countries, study 
differences in the dynamics of the tradables v. nontradables sectors, and contrast the macro dynamics of 
credit booms with evidence from micro-level data.   4
financial crises, while they found that the likelihood of financial crises does not increase 
significantly when credit booms are present. 
Our work is also related to the analysis of the credit transmission channel in twin 
banking-currency crises by Tornell and Westermann (2005).
3  These authors document 
that twin crises are preceded by rising credit-GDP ratios, increases in output of 
nontradables relative to tradables, and real appreciations, followed by declines in all of 
these variables. In addition, they used the World Bank’s World Business Economic 
Survey (WBES) to document asymmetries in the access to credit markets of firms in the 
tradables v. non-tradables sectors. We also look at sectoral differences in the evolution of 
output dynamics and firm-level financial indicators, but our approach differs in that we 
examine these dynamics conditional on credit boom episodes, rather than conditional on 
being on a twin-crises event. Also, we use actual balance-sheet and cash-flow-statement 
data to measure firm-level financial indicators for all publicly listed corporations, instead 
of using the survey data of more limited coverage in the WBES. 
Our frequency analysis of the association of credit booms with capital inflows, 
financial reforms, and TFP gains is related to theoretical and empirical studies on the 
mechanisms that drive credit booms. These include theories in which excessive credit 
expansion is due to herding behavior by banks (Kindleberger (2000)); information 
problems that lead to bank-interdependent lending policies (Rajan (1994) and Gorton and 
He (2005)), the underestimation of risks (Borio, et. al. (2001)) and the lowering of 
lending standards (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)); the presence of explicit or implicit 
government guarantees (Corsetti, et. al. (1999)); or limited commitment on the part of 
                                                 
3  Tornell and Westermann also study the extent financial market imperfections influences the cycle in the 
middle income countries during tranquil times.  See also Scheneider and Tornell (2004).   5
borrowers (Lorenzoni (2005)).
 Similarly, our analysis of the connection between credit 
booms and macroeconomic activity is related to the literature on business cycle models 
that incorporate “financial accelerators,” by which shocks to asset prices and relative 
good prices are amplified through balance sheet effects (see, for example, Fisher (1933), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), and Mendoza (2005) and (2006)). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our method for 
identifying credit booms, implements it on a sample of 49 countries, and examines the 
main characteristics of credit booms in industrial and emerging economies. Sections 3 
and 4 study the credit-boom dynamics of macro aggregates and micro-level data, 
respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
 2.  Credit Booms: Methodology and Key Features 
2.1 Methodology 
A credit boom is defined in general as an episode in which credit to the private sector 
grows by more than during a typical business cycle expansion. We formalize this 
definition as follows. Denote the deviation from the long-run trend in the logarithm of 
real credit per capita in country i, date t as lit, and the corresponding standard deviation of 
this cyclical component as ( ) i l σ . The long-run trend is calculated using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter set at 100, as is typical for annual data. 
Country i is defined to have experienced a credit boom when we identify one or more 
contiguous dates for which the credit boom condition  , () it i ll φσ ≥  holds, where φ is the 
boom threshold factor. Thus, during a credit boom the deviations from trend in credit 
exceed the typical expansion of credit over the business cycle by a factor of φ or more.   6
We used a baseline value of φ = 1.75, and conducted sensitivity analysis for φ = 1.5, 2 
(which confirmed that our main results are robust to the value of φ). 
The date of the peak of the credit boom (ˆ t ) is the date that shows the maximum 
difference between lit and φ () i l σ from the set of contiguous dates that satisfy the credit 
boom condition. Given ˆ t , the starting date of the credit boom is a date t
s such that t
s < ˆ t  
and t
s yields the smallest difference  , |( ) |
s
it i ll φσ − , and the ending date t
e is a date t
e > ˆ t  
that yields the smallest difference  , |( ) |
e
it i ll φσ − , where φ
s and φ
e are the start and end 
thresholds.
4 We use baseline values φ
s=φ
e =1, and we also tried other values including 0, 
¼, ½ and ¾.
5 Once the starting and ending dates are set, the duration of the credit boom is 
given by the difference t
e – t
s.  
2.2  Credit boom episodes and their main features 
We use data on credit from the financial sector to the private non-financial sector 
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics for a sample of 49 countries, 
21 industrial and 28 emerging economies (see Appendix 1), for the 1960-2006 period. 
Our measure of credit is the sum of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks 
(IFS line 22d) plus, whenever available for the entire sample period for a given country, 
claims on the private sector by other financial institutions (IFS line 42d). Because credit 
is a year-end stock variable that we are going to compare with flow variables like output 
and expenditures, real credit per capita is calculated as the average of two contiguous 
end-of-year observations of nominal credit per capita deflated by their corresponding 
                                                 
4 These threshold conditions are set to minimize the absolute values of differences of lit relative to targets 
because the data are discrete, and hence in general lit does not match the targets with equality.  
5 We use thresholds such that φ
s =φ
e < φ, but notice that in principle φ
s and φ
e could differ, and one or both 
could be set equal to φ.   7
end-of-year consumer price index.  Data sources for these and all other variables used in 
the paper are listed in Appendix 2. 
We identified 49 credit booms in our data, 27 in industrial countries and 22 in 
emerging economies.
6 Figure 1 provides a summary view of these credit booms by 
plotting the cross-country mean and median of the cyclical components of real credit per 
capita in seven-year event windows centered at the peak of credit booms for the two 
groups of countries. These graphs show that credit booms in emerging economies are 
larger than in industrial countries in absolute terms: At the peak of the booms, the 
average expansion in real credit per capita reached almost 30 percent above trend in 
emerging economies, twice what is observed in industrial countries. In relative terms 
(i.e. in multiples of the standard deviation of credit in each country), however, credit 
booms in industrial countries are similar to those in emerging economies (see Figure 2). 
This is because the cyclical variability of credit is larger in the latter.   
Table 1 shows the duration of credit booms for different starting and ending 
thresholds, and the length of the corresponding upswing and downswing phases. In 
general, the results based on medians indicate that EMs and ICs show booms with 
similar duration of about 6-7, years and upswings that last longer than downswings. 
Using means, however, EMs seem to show longer and more asymmetric booms, but this 
result is driven largely by the countries that experienced Sudden Stops.  
Credit booms tend to be clustered geographically and not limited to a single region: 
40 percent of the booms experienced by emerging economies were observed in East Asia 
and 32 percent in Latin America. Likewise, 33 percent of the credit booms in industrial 
                                                 
6 There are also four emerging economies (India, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela) that were identified 
as experiencing credit booms in 2006, the end of the sample period, but they were excluded from the event 
analysis because they have yet to be completed (i.e. the ending thresholds have yet to be crossed).   8
countries were observed in the G7 and 18 percent in the Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden). In addition, Figure 3 shows that credit booms tend to be 
synchronized internationally and centered around big events—e.g. the Bretton Woods 
collapse of the early 1970s, the petro dollars boom in the prelude to the 1980s debt crisis, 
the ERM and Nordic country crises of the early 1990s, and the recent Sudden Stops. The 
Figure also suggests that the frequency of credit booms in industrial countries seems to 
have declined over time, but this may in fact reflect the pattern of financial deepening 
away from banks and into non-bank financial intermediaries, rather than an actual 
reduction in the occurrence of credit booms.
7 A credit boom driven by non-bank 
financial intermediaries would not be captured in the IFS data that we used.
 8 
2.3  Differences with the method of Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche 
As noted in the Introduction, several recent studies of credit booms use the thresholds 
method proposed by GVL, but their method yields results that differ markedly from ours. 
Hence, it is important to explain why the two methodologies produce different results. 
Both methods are threshold methods: They define credit booms by identifying periods in 
which credit is deemed to have expanded “too much” relative to a long-run trend. 
However, the two methods differ in three key respects:  
(1)  Measure of credit: We use real credit per capita, while GVL use the ratio of 
nominal credit to nominal GDP. The latter has three limitations. One is that it 
does not allow for the possibility that credit and output could have different 
trends, which is important if countries are undergoing a process of financial 
                                                 
7 For example, Rajan (2005) argues that technical change, deregulation, and institutional change have 
resulted in an increasing number of arm’s length transactions away from banks in the financial system.   
8 Indeed, the growing securitization of subprime mortgages in the United States in recent years was 
accompanied by an increase in the off-balance sheet operations of bank entities.      9
deepening, or if for other reasons the trend of GDP and that of credit are 
progressing at different rates. Second, there can be situations when both nominal 
credit and GDP are falling and yet the ratio increases because GDP falls more 
rapidly. Lastly, when inflation is high, the fluctuations of the credit to GDP ratio 
could be misleading because of improper price adjustments. 
(2)  Detrending procedure: We detrend the credit data using a standard application of 
the HP filter to our full sample period 1960-2006 with the value of the HP 
smoothing parameter commonly used with annual data (100). In contrast, GVL 
used an expanding HP trend with a smoothing parameter of 1000. This expanding 
trend extends the sample over which the trend is computed by one year as each 
successive year in the sample is added (see Appendix 3 for details).  
(3)  Definition of thresholds: Our thresholds are defined as multiples of the country-
specific standard deviation of credit over the business cycle, which changes the 
threshold level of credit needed to define a boom (i.e. the product  ( ) i l φσ ) with 
each country’s cyclical variability of credit. This ensures that a credit boom is a 
situation in which the deviation from trend in credit is “unusually large” relative 
to a country’s typical credit cycle. In contrast, GVL use a boom threshold that is 
invariant across countries, regardless of whether it represents a small or large 
change relative to a country’s historical cyclical variability of credit. 
These differences have significant quantitative implications. To illustrate these 
differences, we apply the two methods to the case of Chile, which is also the case that 
GVL used to illustrate their method. Figure 4 shows the results of applying our method to 
Chilean data. Panel 1 shows results using our method exactly as described in 2.1. It   10
shows the actual data for the log of real credit per capita, the HP trend, and the boom and 
start/end thresholds.
9 Panel 2 changes the smoothing parameter from 100 to the value 
used by GVL (1000). Panel 3 changes the measure of credit from real credit per capita to 
GVL’s ratio of credit to GDP. Panel 4 changes both the smoothing parameter and the 
definition of credit for the ones used in GVL, but retains our country-specific thresholds. 
Our baseline results in Panel 1 indicate that Chile experienced a credit boom that 
peaked in 1981 and lasted five years (from 1979 to 1983). Panel 3 shows that if we use 
the credit-GDP ratio as the measure of credit, the boom peaks in 1984 and also lasts five 
years (from 1981 to 1985). Thus, under our method the choice of credit variable affects 
the timing of the boom but not its duration. In contrast, Panels 2 and 4 show that 
increasing the smoothing parameter from 100 to 1000 affects the timing of the boom, and 
increases both the size of its peak and its duration. This occurs because a larger 
smoothing parameter produces a smoother trend with larger and more persistent 
deviations from trend. 
Figure 5 conducts a similar experiment as Figure 4 but now starting in Panel 1 with 
the results produced by applying the GVL method as proposed in their paper. Panel 2 
lowers the smoothing parameter to 100. Panel 3 changes the measure of credit from the 
credit-GDP ratio to real credit per capita. Panel 4 changes both the measure of credit and 
the smoothing parameter to the ones we used, but retains the country-invariant threshold 
proposed by GVL. 
The results in Panel 1 of Figure 5 are nearly identical to those obtained by GVL (see 
Figure 2b in their paper), confirming that our implementation of their methodology is 
accurate. The GVL method indicates that Chile experienced a credit boom that peaked in 
                                                 
9 We set the start and end thresholds equal to 1.   11
1982 and lasted fourteen years (from 1971 to 1984).
10 Panels 3 and 4 show that if we 
change the credit measure to real credit per capita, the GVL method cannot identify a 
credit boom in Chile in the sample period, regardless of the value of the smoothing 
parameter. This is because deviations from trend in real credit per capita at least as large 
as 19.5 percent were not observed in Chile, and indeed are extremely large relative to the 
Chilean history of deviations from trend in real credit per capita. In contrast, our method 
adjusts the boom threshold to the observed country cyclical variability of credit. As a 
result, our methodology is robust to the choice of measuring credit in real per capita 
terms v. as a share of GDP. 
Panel 2 of Figure 5 shows that when the expanding HP trend is calculated using a 
smoothing parameter equal to 100, the GVL method does identify a credit boom in the 
early 1980s, but one that lasted only three years instead of fourteen—again because a 
larger smoothing parameter produces a smoother trend with larger and more persistent 
deviations from trend. Thus, the higher smoothing parameter used in GVL’s calculations 
is the key factor behind the long duration of the credit boom they identified (compare 
Panels 1 and 2). 
One key additional feature that affects the quantitative implications of the two 
methods is that the expanding trend with high smoothing parameter of the GVL method 
results in a trend that approximates a smoothed version of the actual time series of credit 
with some lag (see Figure 6). The standard HP trend used in our method and GVL’s 
expanding HP trend are very similar at the beginning and at the end of the sample, but in 
most of the “internal” periods (and particularly during the period of fast credit growth) 
                                                 
10 GVL dated the peak in the same year and found the boom to be of about the same magnitude, but 
estimated its duration at 10 years. This difference is due to the longer sample in our data (which ends in 
2006 instead of 1996), and because of data revisions in the credit-to-GDP data relative to our sample.     12
the expanding trend resembles a smoothed lagged transformation of the data. Hence, in 
these periods the expanding trend treats actual observations of high credit-GDP ratios as 
being largely part of the long-run trend of credit, when in reality they are not.    
3.  Credit Booms and Macroeconomic Dynamics 
This Section examines the business cycle behavior of the economy during credit 
boom events, and conducts a frequency analysis of the association between credit booms 
and financial crises, and between credit booms and some of their potential determinants. 
3.1 Event  analysis 
We construct seven-year event windows of the cyclical components of macro 
aggregates centered on the peak of credit booms (i.e. ˆ t is normalized to date t=0). The 
windows show the cross-country means and medians of output (Y), private consumption 
(C), public consumption (G), investment (I), the output of nontradables (YN), the real 
exchange rate (RER), the current account-output ratio (CAY) and total capital inflows as 
share of output (KI). All these variables are at constant prices, expressed in per-capita 
terms and detrended with the HP filter setting the smoothing parameter at 100, except for 
RER (which is not in per-capita terms) and the current account-output and capital 
inflows-output ratios (which are at current prices and not expressed in per capita terms).
11 
Figures 7-10 illustrate business cycle dynamics around credit boom episodes in 
emerging and industrial economies. Except for RER and KI, there is little difference in 
the dynamics produced by country means and medians, indicating that the results are not 
driven by outliers. Consider first the plots for emerging economies in the right-side of the 
Figures. Y, C and G rise 2 to 4 percentage points above trend in the build up phase of the 
                                                 
11 Due to data limitations we exclude Jordan from the event analysis.   13
credit boom, and drop to between 3 to 4 percent below trend in the recessive phase. I, YN 
and RER follow a similar pattern but display significantly larger expansions and 
recessions. Investment rises up to 18 percent above trend at t=-1 and drops below trend 
by a similar amount by t=2. YN rises to about 6½ percent above trend by t=0 and then 
drops to almost 3 percent below trend by t=3. The median RER appreciates 9 percent 
above trend at t=-1, and drops to a low of about 4 percent below trend when the credit 
boom unwinds. CAY displays the opposite pattern: it declines to a deficit of about 2½ 
percentage points of GDP in the expanding phase of the boom and then rises to a surplus 
of 1½ percentage points of GDP in the declining phase. In line with these current account 
dynamics, KI rises by up to 3½ percentage points of GDP by t=-1 and then drops by 2¼ 
percentage points of GDP by t=3. 
The plots for industrial countries in the left-side panels of Figures 7-10 show several 
similarities with those for emerging economies, but also some important differences. 
Output, expenditures and the current account in the industrial countries follow a cyclical 
pattern similar to that observed in the emerging economies, but the amplitude of these 
fluctuations is smaller, and government consumption shows the opposite pattern (slightly 
below trend in the expanding phase and slightly above trend in the contraction phase). 
Two important caveats apply to the event study graphs. First, they illustrate the 
cyclical dynamics of macro variables, but do not show if these variables themselves are 
undergoing a boom (i.e. an unusually large expansion as defined by our thresholds 
method). Table 2 provides evidence to examine this issue by listing the fraction of credit 
booms associated with booms in output and expenditures that occur in any year inside the 
seven-year window of the credit boom events. The results show that between 30 to 60   14
percent of the credit booms are associated with booms in Y, YN, C, I, and G, and this 
holds for emerging and industrial countries, as well as for all the countries together.  
The second caveat of the event study graphs is that they show point estimates of 
measures of central tendency (means and medians), but do not demonstrate if these 
moments are statistically significant. To explore this issue, we run cross-section 
regressions of each macro variable for each date of the event window on a constant. The 
standard error for the median (mean) is obtained using quintile (OLS) regressions. As 
Table 3 shows, the majority of the mean and median estimates shown in the event study 
plots for Y, YN, C, and I are statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level for 
industrial and emerging economies. For G, RER and CA/Y, however, many of the 
coefficients have large standard errors. 
Another potential caveat of the event analysis is that the relationships it captures 
between credit booms and macro variables may not be particular to credit booms, but 
may reflect overall business cycle patterns. In particular, one could ask if the results 
would be any different if instead of identifying credit booms and using them to condition 
the event analysis, we were to identify output booms and use them as the conditioning 
variable (defining output booms with the same thresholds method we applied for credit 
booms). We explored this possibility by constructing seven-year event windows of 
fluctuations in macro variables (including private sector credit) centered on the peak 
dates of output booms. In the case of the emerging economies, there is no discernible 
cyclical pattern in the behavior of credit. Thus, there is an output cycle associated with 
credit booms, but there is no credit cycle associated with output booms. For industrial 
countries, we found that there is a cyclical pattern in the behavior of credit during output   15
booms, but one that is much less pronounced than during credit booms, and some features 
of the boom-bust dynamics we identified during credit booms are not present during 
output booms (housing prices, in particular, do not fall in the aftermath of output booms). 
We now study the behavior of inflation, equity prices and housing prices during credit 
booms (see Figure 11). Industrial countries show negligible changes in inflation, and 
rising (falling) equity and housing prices in the build up (declining) phase of credit 
booms. In emerging economies, inflation tends to spike after the credit booms peak, but 
this result is driven by outliers because the mean inflation at t=1 exceeds the median 
inflation by a large margin. The median inflation rises only 2 percent above trend. Hence, 
credit booms are generally not associated with surges in inflation in either industrial or 
emerging economies. Stock and housing prices show the same pattern in emerging 
economies as in industrial countries, but note that the rise in equity prices in the upswing 
and the decline in housing prices in the downswing are larger in the former. 
The event windows for industrial and emerging economies mask important variations 
across country regions. In industrial countries, the Nordic countries show larger 
fluctuations in credit and in the macro variables than the G7 (Table 4, Panel A). In 
addition, some of the macro variables in the Nordic countries peak earlier than credit. In 
the case of the emerging economies (Table 4, Panel B), output and investment 
fluctuations in Asia and Latin America are similar, but credit expansions and the 
fluctuations in consumption are much larger in the latter. In contrast, the current account 
reversals when the credit booms revert are larger in Asia. 
In summary, the macro event study shows that credit booms across emerging and 
industrial economies are associated with a well-defined pattern of economic expansion in   16
the build-up phase of the booms, followed by contraction in the declining phase. Output, 
expenditures, stock prices, housing prices, and the real exchange rate move above trend 
in the first phase, and drop below trend in the second phase, and the current account falls 
first and then rises. All of this happens without major changes in inflation. Beyond these 
similarities, credit booms in emerging and industrial economies differ in four key 
respects: (1) the amplitude of the macroeconomic fluctuations is smaller in industrial 
countries; (2) government consumption in industrial countries fluctuates very little and 
shows the opposite pattern of that in emerging economies; (3) the current account-output 
ratio and the (median) capital inflows-output ratio also display smaller changes in 
industrial countries, and their timing differs sharply (CAY does not hit its trough in the 
build up phase of the credit boom); and (4) fluctuations in the nontradables sector of 
industrial countries are much smaller, and RER actually depreciates slightly, instead of 
appreciating sharply, in the expansionary phase of credit booms. 
These differences in the macro features of credit booms across industrial and 
emerging economies are consistent with three well-known facts in international business 
cycle studies: First, the larger amplitude of the fluctuations displayed by emerging 
economies is in line with well-established evidence showing that business cycles are 
larger in developing countries (see Mendoza (1995), Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). Second, the striking difference in the behavior of 
government purchases is consistent with the evidence produced in the literature on the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries (see Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh 
(2005)). Third, the widening current account deficits followed by reversals, and the 
booms followed by collapses in the price and output of the nontradables sector, are   17
consistent with observations highlighted in the Sudden Stops literature (e.g. Calvo 
(1998), Mendoza (2007), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001)). However, it is important 
to note that generally these facts have been documented by examining macroeconomic 
data without conditioning for credit booms. In contrast, our results apply specifically to 
fluctuations associated with credit boom episodes. This is particularly relevant for the 
Sudden Stop facts (i.e. the reversals in CAY and the boom-bust cycles in RER and YN), 
because most of the Sudden Stops literature emphasizes the role of credit transmission 
mechanisms in explaining Sudden Stops. 
Our finding that credit booms are associated with a well-defined cyclical pattern in 
output and expenditures contrasts sharply with the findings of GVL showing only 
ambiguous evidence of this association. Figure 6 in their paper shows a small cycle in 
GDP, a decline in GDP growth below trend for the entire duration of credit booms, and 
no cycle in consumption. 
3.3 Frequency  analysis  
We conduct next a frequency analysis to examine three issues: (1) the association 
between credit booms and financial crises; (2) the role of capital inflows, productivity 
gains, financial reforms and exchange rate regimes as preconditions of credit booms; and 
(3) the probability of experiencing a credit boom once the starting threshold is crossed.  
Credit booms are often cited as the culprit behind financial crises, particularly in 
emerging economies (see Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002). If this is the case, credit booms 
should be closely associated with financial crises. Table 5 shows the percent of banking 
crises, currency crises and Sudden Stops that occurred during the seven-year window of 
the credit boom events in emerging economies, industrial countries and all countries   18
combined. The percent of crises that occurred before, after and at the peak of the credit 
booms are listed in separate columns. The dates identifying the occurrence of these crises 
were obtained from sources in the empirical literature (Demirguic-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2006) for banking crises, Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) for currency crises, and Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) for Sudden Stops).  
Table 5 yields an important result: Credit booms in emerging economies are often 
associated with currency crises, banking crises, and Sudden Stops. About 68 percent of 
the credit booms in emerging economies are associated with currency crises, 55 percent 
with banking crises, and 32 percent with Sudden Stops. Most of these crises either 
preceded or coincided with the peak of the credit booms, suggesting that many of the 
booms ended after a country suffered a crisis. These findings are also at odds with the 
conclusion in GVL suggesting that there is virtually no association between credit booms 
and financial crises in emerging economies. 
Table 5 also shows that, contrary to what we found in emerging economies, credit 
booms in industrial countries are only occasionally associated with banking and currency 
crises, and there is no association with Sudden Stops. Moreover, industrial countries in a 
credit boom are more likely to experience currency crises than banking crises. The 
combined frequency of currency crises before, after or at the peak of credit booms is 
slightly over 50 percent, while that for banking crises is 15 percent. In contrast with the 
emerging economies, currency crises are more frequent after the peak of credit booms. 
We also constructed seven-year event windows that compare the fluctuations in credit 
and macro aggregates of countries that experienced a crisis (i.e. banking crisis, currency 
crisis, or Sudden Stop) with those that did not. The results (available from the authors on   19
request) show clearly that the macro fluctuations in the countries that experienced crisis 
are larger and display more abrupt declines than those of the non-crisis countries. 
Consider now the frequency analysis of the association between credit booms and 
large capital inflows, financial reforms, and TFP gains. Capital inflows are measured as 
gross liability flows (i.e. foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other investments 
liabilities) in percent of GDP, using data from IFS (see Appendix 2). We define a state of 
large capital inflows as of date t when the preceding three-year average of capital inflows 
ranked on the top quartile of its respective country group (i.e. emerging markets, 
industrial countries, or both) over the 1975-2006 period.
12 Domestic financial reforms are 
measured using the index produced by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2007).  This 
index takes values between 0 and 21 and includes information on reserve requirements 
and credit controls, interest rate controls, barriers to entry, state ownership, policies on 
securities markets, banking regulation, and capital account restrictions. We identify a 
country undertaking significant financial reforms as of date t if the preceding three-year 
change in this index ranks on the top quartile of its respective country group over the 
1975-2002 period. Our measure of TFP is based on standard growth accounting methods 
(see, for instance, Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) and Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2008)), 
using labor and investment data from PWT 6.2. A country is identified to have 
experienced high TFP growth as of date t if the preceding three-year average of TFP 
growth ranked on the top quartile of its respective group over the 1975-2006 period. 
Table 6 shows the fraction of credit booms preceded by large capital inflows, 
domestic financial reforms, and large TFP gains. Because these factors are often 
                                                 
12 We focus on the preceding three-year average because we are interested in the role of capital inflows (as 
well as TFP and financial reforms) as potential causes of credit booms, so we are interested in studying if 
credit booms are preceded by these developments as a form of statistical causality.    20
interconnected and may interact with each other, we compute the frequency of credit 
booms that coincided with each factor individually as well as jointly with pairs of two 
factors or with all three factors together. For industrial countries, the results indicate that 
40 percent of the credit booms followed large TFP gains and 33 percent followed 
significant financial reforms. In contrast, in emerging economies we find that over 50 
percent of credit booms were preceded by large capital inflows, while TFP gains and 
financial reforms play a small role. Thus, credit booms in industrial countries are 
preceded by TFP gains and/or domestic financial reforms and to a much lesser extent by 
surges in capital inflows, while the opposite is observed in emerging economies. 
Table 7 shows the results of a similar frequency analysis but now aimed at examining 
the association between the peak of credit booms and the exchange rate regimes in place 
the preceding three years. We use Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) classification of 
exchange rate regimes to create the following four regime groupings: fixed and managed, 
dirty floating, floating and mixed (see the footnote to Table 6 for details). The mixed 
regime includes countries that switched across the other regimes in any of the three years 
prior to the peak of the credit boom. The results shown in Table 6 are striking: about ¾ of 
the credit booms occur in countries with managed or fixed exchange rate regimes, and 
this holds for industrial countries, emerging economies, and all countries combined. 
Finally, we use frequency analysis to determine the probability that a country will 
experience a credit boom once it has crossed the starting threshold. This probability can 
be a useful “early warning” indicator for surveillance of credit market conditions. We 
considered starting thresholds of ½ and 1 standard deviations of the cyclical component 
of our credit measure, and computed the probabilities for industrial countries, emerging   21
economies and all countries combined. Once a starting threshold of 1 (½) standard 
deviations is crossed, the probability of a credit boom is 16 (9) percent for emerging 
economies, 22 (14) percent for industrial countries, and 18 (11) percent for all countries 
combined. Naturally, these probabilities are lower with the lower starting threshold, as it 
is less likely that the cyclical expansion of credit turns into a credit boom. The 
probabilities are higher for industrial than for emerging economies, indicating that having 
crossed the starting threshold is a more precise predictor of credit booms in the former 
than in the latter. 
4.  Credit Booms and Firm Level Data 
Section 3 showed that credit booms are accompanied by a synchronized pattern of 
economic expansion followed by contraction. This finding raises an important question: 
Are the credit booms and the macro business cycles that accompany them reflected in the 
financial conditions of firms and banks at the microeconomic level? To answer this 
question, we use the credit boom events identified in Section 2 to construct seven-year 
event windows of the evolution of firm- and bank-level financial indicators centered on 
the years in which credit booms peaked.  
The firm-level data correspond to nonfinancial, publicly-traded firms as reported in 
Worldscope and Datastream. The sample period is 1980 to 2005 for the industrial 
countries and 1991 to 2005 for the emerging markets. This restricts our analysis to credit 
booms dated after 1991 in the emerging markets. Moreover these data have the 
drawbacks that the coverage is limited to corporations listed in stock exchanges, and that   22
they are reported on a fiscal year basis, rather than calendar year. Note, however, that 
there is no other firm-level, cross-country database with wider coverage available.
13 
The bank-level data was obtained from Bankscope and it covers the 1995-2005 
period.
14 These data include balance sheet information for commercial banks, saving 
banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks, medium- and long-term credit banks, and 
bank holding companies. The coverage varies from country to country, and since the 
sample starts in 1995 our analysis of banking behavior around credit booms is limited to 
the last decade.  In the analysis below, we do not report bank indicators for the industrial 
countries because these countries have experienced only three credit booms since 1995.  
It is worth noting, however, that the behavior of these indicators is broadly in line with 
that observed in the emerging market economies. 
We construct financial indicators for each firm and bank in each country, and focus 
on the median firm or bank as country aggregate. Aggregates for emerging and industrial 
countries are then generated as medians of the country aggregates. For the firm-level 
data, we also construct the breakdown across tradables and nontradables sectors, and 
measure sectoral aggregates using the median firm of the corresponding sector.
15 
4.1 Firm-level  indicators 
We construct seven firm-level financial indicators: (1) two measures of Tobin’s Q 
(the ratio of market to book value of equity, Q1, and the ratio of market value plus total 
                                                 
13 The data are corrected for the presence of multiple listings (firms with multiple country listings are 
assigned only to the country of primary listing), dead stocks (companies that go out of business are taken 
out from the sample), and outliers (which can be due to either inadequate accounting, as in the case of firms 
listed with negative market capitalizations, or statistical outliers, observations that are in excess of two 
standard deviations from the mean observation). 
14 The data are corrected for the presence of the central bank and government and multilateral institutions 
as well as for outliers (either because of inadequate accounting or extreme values).   
15 The nontradables sector includes the following industries: construction, printing and publishing, 
recreation, retailers, transportation, utilities, and miscellaneous. The tradables sector includes aerospace, 
apparel, automotive, beverages, chemical, electrical, electronics, metals, and all others in the database.   23
debt to book value, Q2); (2) effective interest rate (the ratio of total debt service to total 
debt obligations, ER); (3) profitability (the return on assets in percent, PR) ; (4) total 
leverage (total debt as a percent of book value of assets, LBV, or market value of assets, 
LMV); (5) short-term leverage (short-term debt as a percent of market value of assets, 
SLMV); (6) working capital leverage (current liabilities in percent of sales, LWK); and (7) 
the Rajan-Zingales index of dependence on external financing for investment (RZ), which 
is equal to 1 minus the ratio of cash flow from operations to capital expenditures (with 
the former adjusted for changes in inventories, payables, and receivables). 
Figures 12-17 show the event windows for the financial indicators of firms in 
industrial and emerging economies. Figure 12 shows that all leverage ratios rise in the 
build up phase of the credit booms and collapse in the declining phase. As in the case of 
the macro variables, the amplitude of the fluctuations is much larger for emerging 
economies than for industrial countries. Note, however, that the increases in LMV are 
particularly large because LMV includes the effect of equity price declines that coincide 
with credit boom peaks. Still, the boom-bust cycles in leverage synchronized with credit 
booms are also evident in LBV and LWK, which do not use the market value of equity. In 
emerging economies, LBV rises about 20 percentage points from its minimum in the 
upswing of the boom to the peak (compared with 12 percentage points in industrial 
countries) and LWK rises almost 12 percentage points (compared with 2 percentage 
points in industrial countries). 
The Tobin Q and profitability measures shown in Figure 13 indicate that corporations 
in both industrial and emerging economies start the expanding phase of credit booms 
from high ratios of asset valuation and profitability, which decline as the credit boom   24
peaks and then remain depressed in the aftermath. Again the magnitude of these 
fluctuations is much larger in emerging economies. In contrast, the dynamics of the 
effective interest rate are very different in the two groups of countries. In emerging 
markets, ER is low in the expansionary phase of the credit booms, and then jumps about 
500 basis points one year after the booms peak. In industrial countries, ER is significantly 
more stable, and in fact drops slightly after the credit booms peak. 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of the RZ index. Corporations are significantly more 
dependent on external financing in the build up phase of credit booms than in the 
downswing. The size of the correction in the downswing is much larger in emerging 
economies than in industrial countries. This evidence is consistent with the argument of 
Calvo et al. (2003) suggesting that “creditless recoveries” after Sudden Stops are possible 
in emerging economies because firms adjust to the loss of credit so as to provide internal 
financing for operational expenses that were previously financed with outside credit. 
Figure 15 illustrates important similarities and differences in the evolution of 
corporate financial indicators across regions of emerging economies. Firms in Asia are 
significantly more leveraged than their Latin American counterparts, and their leverage 
ratios fluctuate more sharply during credit booms. Moreover, Tobin’s Q in Asia falls 
sharply in a continuous decline during the entire seven-year window, while in Latin 
America it shows an ambiguous pattern and a more modest overall decline. Dependence 
on external financing falls sharply in both regions in the downswing of credit booms, but 
the correction is larger in Latin America than in Asia. 
Figure 16 shows the evolution of the financial indicators of emerging economies for 
which the tradables and nontradables sectors behave differently (LBV, LMV , LWK and   25
RZ).
16 We also include the real exchange rate as a proxy for the relative price of 
nontradable goods relative to tradables. The cycles in leverage (LBV, LMV and LWK) 
synchronized with the credit booms are again observable in the sectoral aggregates, but 
now we can also observe that they are significantly larger for firms in the nontradables 
sector and that they are synchronized with the sharp boom-bust cycle of the real exchange 
rate. Moreover, the RZ index shows that firms in the tradables sector are slightly more 
dependent on outside financing in the expansionary phase of credit booms, and that 
dependence on outside financing falls sharply for firms in both sectors, but significantly 
more for firms in the nontradables sector. These results are consistent with the Sudden 
Stops literature that emphasizes the ability of firms in the tradables sector to have more 
stable access to credit than firms in the nontradables sector (e.g. Caballero and 
Krishnamurty (1998), Tornell and Westernmann (2005)). 
4.2  Bank-level indicators 
We constructed four financial indicators using bank data: (1) profitability, measured 
by the ratio of net income to average assets (ROA), where average assets are calculated as 
the mean of end-of period assets in year t and t-1; (2) non-performing loans, NPL, as a 
measure of asset quality; (3) a measure of lending activity as proxied by the ratio of bank 
loans to total assets, LAR; and (4) a “capital adequacy” measure, CAR, that measures a 
bank’s capital as a ratio of its risk-weighted assets.
17 The minimum CAR recommended 
by the Basel Committee in Banking Supervision is 8 percent, however, bank supervisors 
                                                 
16 The rest of the financial ratios display very similar dynamics across sectors as in the total aggregates 
shown already in Figures 12-14.  
17   This measure combines “Tier I capital,” which includes stock issues and disclosed reserves, and “Tier II 
capital,” which includes subordinated debt, perpetual securities, expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets and off-balance-sheet risks (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1993)).    26
in the more vulnerable economies, such as EMs, are encouraged to set higher minimum 
CARs (often in the 8-12 percent range). 
Figure 17 shows the event study window for the financial indicators of banks in 
emerging economies. Lending activity is high in the expanding phase of the credit boom, 
but at the same time the quality of the banks’ assets deteriorates sharply as non-
performing loans rise from 2.5 percent a year before the peak to 10 percent two years 
after the peak of the boom. This evidence is consistent with Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez’s 
(2006) argument that the banks’ lowering of lending standards in a boom increases 
lending to more risky clients, and hence leads to a subsequent weakening of the quality of 
bank’s assets. 
The profitability measure indicates that banks yield high profits in the expanding 
phase of credit booms. ROA reaches its highest level at 1.5 percent a year before the peak 
of the boom, followed by a collapse in the ending phase of the boom. Finally, bank 
capital adequacy shows v-shaped dynamics—it drops sharply late in the expanding phase 
of credit booms and then rebounds early in the ending phase of the boom, ending at 
higher levels than when the booms start. Interestingly, CAR at its trough was just below 
12 percent which points to vulnerabilities in the banking system of these economies.    
5.  Conclusions 
This paper proposed a new thresholds method for measuring credit booms, used this 
method to identify credit booms in industrial and emerging economies, and conducted an 
event study analysis of the dynamics of macro aggregates and micro-level financial 
indicators during credit booms. We identified 27 credit booms in industrial countries and 
22 in emerging economies during the 1960-2006 period. The build up phase of these   27
booms is associated with economic expansions, rising equity and housing prices, real 
currency appreciation, and widening external deficits, followed by the opposite dynamics 
in the downswing. Similar dynamics are observed in firm-level indicators of leverage, 
firm values, and dependence on external financing, and in bank-level indicators of asset 
quality, profitability and lending activity. Moreover, credit booms tend to be 
synchronized internationally and centered on “big events” like the 1980s debt crisis, the 
1992 ERM crisis, and Sudden Stops in emerging economies. 
Despite the similarities in the features of credit booms across industrial and emerging 
economies, there are also three major differences: (1) Fluctuations in macroeconomic 
aggregates and micro-level indicators during credit booms are larger, more persistent, and 
asymmetric in the emerging economies, and this pattern is particularly strong in the 
nontradables sector; (2) not all credit booms end in crisis, but many of the recent 
emerging markets crises were associated with credit booms; (3) credit booms in emerging 
economies tend to be preceded by large capital inflows and not by domestic financial 
reforms or TFP gains, while credit booms in industrial countries tend to be preceded by 
high TFP or financial reforms. In contrast, the frequency of credit booms in both 
emerging and industrial economies is much higher in economies with fixed or managed 
exchange rates. These results differ significantly from previous findings in the literature 
on credit booms suggesting an ambiguous relationship between credit booms and 
economic expansions, and little or no association between financial crises and credit 
booms (see Gourinchas et al. (2001)). 
The results of our study have important implications for the analysis of macro-finance 
linkages, and for surveillance of financial systems and their macroeconomic effects.   28
From the policy perspective, the thresholds method we proposed provides a tractable 
framework for measuring and identifying credit booms that are closely associated with 
cyclical fluctuations in macro aggregates and key financial indicators of corporations and 
banks. Our results show that credit booms can be identified by the size of a credit 
expansion relative to trend, and that this information can be supplemented with other 
indicators of excessive credit growth: such as booms in output and expenditures, 
excessive real appreciation and/or expansion of the nontradables sector, large inflows of 
foreign capital (in EMs) and fast TFP growth or domestic financial reforms (in ICs), as 
well as increases in the leverage and profitability ratios of corporations and weakening in 
the quality of banks’ assets. Moreover, our results also highlight the importance of using 
corrective policy actions to prevent credit booms, because the declining phase of credit 
booms is associated with recessions and a higher incidence of financial crises. 
From the perspective of research on macro-finance linkages, our results provide a set 
of robust empirical regularities that can guide research on models of “credit transmission” 
by providing the set of facts that these models should aim to explain. These empirical 
regularities can be subsumed into two sets of stylized facts: First, the strong association 
of credit booms with booms in output and expenditures, rising asset prices, widening 
external deficits and sharp real appreciations. Second, the close relationship between 
these macro features of credit booms and a similar cyclical pattern in the financial 
indicators of corporations and banks.   29
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Appendix 1  
SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES 
 
The sample of countries we studied includes the 21 industrial countries and 28 emerging 
economies listed below. The dates of the peaks of credit booms identified for each 





Australia (AUS, 1989), Austria (AUT, 1972 and 1980), Belgium (BEL, 1980 and 1990), 
Canada (CAN, 1967), Denmark (DNK, 1987 and 1991), Finland (FIN, 1991), France 
(FRA, 1991), Germany (DEU, 1973), Greece (GRC, 1972), Ireland (IRL, 1979 and 
2000), Italy (ITA, 1973 and 1992), Japan (JPN, 1973), Netherlands (NLD, 1979), New 
Zealand (NZL, 1974), Norway (NOR, 1988), Portugal (PRT, 1973 and 2001), Spain 
(ESP), Sweden (SWE, 1990), Switzerland (CHE, 1990), United Kingdom (GBR, 1974 
and 1990), and United States (USA, 1999). 
 
  
Emerging Market Economies 
 
Algeria (DZA), Argentina (ARG, 1982), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL, 1981),  Colombia 
(COL, 1997), Costa Rica (CRI, 1979), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV, 1978), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt 
(EGY,1982), Hong Kong (HKG, 1998), India (IND,*), Indonesia (IDN, 1997), Israel 
(ISR, 1979), Jordan (JOR, 1970), Korea (KOR, 1998),  Malaysia (MYS, 1997), Mexico 
(MEX, 1994), Morocco (MAR, 1977), Nigeria (NGA, 1982), Pakistan (PAK, 1986), Peru 
(PER), Philippines (PHL, 1983 and 1997),  Singapore (SGP, 1984), South Africa (ZAF, 
*), Thailand (THA, 1997),  Turkey (TUR, 1997 and *), Uruguay (URY, 1981),  and 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. (VEN, *). 
 
(*)  Ongoing credit booms.   33
Appendix 2:  Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
A.  Macroeconomic and financial data.
Credit to the non-financial Sum of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks (IFS line 22d) plus, IFS.  For some industrial countries data were
private sector whenever available for the entire sample period by other financial institutions completed using the OECD Analytic Database.
(IFS line 42d). Datastream and Heaver Analytics.
Consumer price index Consumer price index (both average and end-of-period). IFS
Nominal GDP GDP in current prices, local currency. WDI
Population Population  WDI
Real GDP Real GDP per-capita, in international prices PWT 6.2
Private consumption Real private consumption per-capita, in international prices PWT 6.2
Government consumption Real government consumption per-captia, in international prices PWT 6.2
Investment Real investment per-capita, in international prices PWT 6.2
Non-tradable GDP Sum of the value added in services plus the value added in industry minus manufacture. WDI
Current account balance Current account balance as percent of GDP WDI
Real exchange rate Real effective exchange rate, index INS (IMF)
Capital inflows Capital inflows  (proxied as the flow of total external liabilities) as percent of GDP. IFS
Real stock prices Equity price indices deflated using consumer price indeces. Authors' calculation with data from IFS.
Real house prices House price indices deflated using consumer price indeces. Authors' calculation with data from several 
country sources, Haever Analytics and
Bloomberg.
Total factor productivity Total factor productivity calculated using the PWT6.2 dataset Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2008).
B.  Microeconomic and financial data.
Tobin's Q Measured by:
(1) The ratio of the market value of a firm's equity to the current replacement Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
cost of assets.
(2) The ratio of the market value of a firm's equity and debt to the current replacement Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
cost of assets.
Leverage Measured by:
(1) The ratio of total debt to book value of equity of the firm. Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
(2) The ratio of total debt to market value of equity of the firm. Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
(3) The ratio of short term debt to market value of equity of the firm. Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
(4) The ratio of current liabilities to sales of the firm. Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
Effective interest rate Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
Return on assets The ratio of net income to total assets. Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
Rajan-Zingales index The ratio of a firm's capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations to Author's calculations with data from Worldscope.
capital expenditures.   This ratio measures a firm's dependence on extenal finance.
Non-performing loans to gross loans ratio The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. This is a measure of asset quality. Author's calculations with data from Bankscope.
Loan to asset ratio The ratio of bank loans to total assets.   Proxies the percentage of assets assigned to Author's calculations with data from Bankscope.
loans.
Return on average assets Ratio of net income to average assets.  This ratio measures the efficiency and  Author's calculations with data from Bankscope.
operational performance of a bank.
Capital adequacy ratio Total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules.  This ratio measures a bank's Bankscope.
capital as a ratio of its risk weighted assets.
C.  Crises definitions
Banking Crises A situation in which at least one of the following conditions holds: (1) the ratio of non- Demirguic-Kunt and Detragiache (2006)
performing assets to total asses of the banking sector exceeds 10 percent;  (2) the cost
of banking system bailouts exceeds 2 percent of GDP; (3) there is a large scale bank
nationalization as result of banking sector problems; and (4) there are bank runs or new
important depositor protection measures.
Currency Crises A situation in which a country experiences a forced change in parity, abandons a Eichengreen and Bordo (2002)
currency peg or receives a bailout from an international organization, and at the same
time an index of exchange rae market pressure (a weighted average of the depreciation
rate, change in short-term interest rate, and percentage change in reserves) rises
1.5 standard deviations above its mean.
Sudden Stops A situation in which a country experiences a year-on-year fall in capital flows that Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004)
exceeds 2 standard deviations relative to the mean.
D. Other variables
Financial reform index The index captures changes in seven financial policy dimensions: Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2007)
(1) credit controls and reserve requirements; (2) Interest rate controls; (3) Entry
barriers; (4) State ownership in the banking sector; (5) Capital account restrictions;
(6) Prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector; and (7) Securities
market policy.  The index is just the sum of these seven dimensions(each of wich can
take values between 0 and 3) and takes values between 0 (the lowest) and 21
(the highest).
Key to sources: IFS=International Financial Statistics, IMF. WDI=World Development Indicators, World Bank, PWT=Penn World Tables, Center for International Comparisons, Univ. of
Pennsylvania, INS=Information Notice System, IMF  34
Appendix 3 
THE GOURINCHAS-VALDES-LANDERRETCHE THRESHOLDS METHOD 
 
The thresholds method proposed by GVL uses the ratio of nominal credit to the 
private sector to nominal GDP () , /
it LY  as the measure of credit.
18 They define the long-
run trend of credit using an “expanding trend” by applying the HP filter as follows: Given 
a sample of data for dates t=1,…,T, denote () , /
EHP
it LY as the expanding HP trend of the 
credit-GDP ratio in country i at date t, for 1≤ t ≤ T. This expanding trend is the trend 




=− ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ , where k is a 
positive integer that defines the length of a sample of “initial data.” In particular, GVL 
used a sample for 1960-1996 and set k=5, so their expanding trend starts in 1965 with 
() ,1965 /
EHP
i LY as the 1965 value of the HP trend computed using data from 1960 to 1965, 
() ,1966 /
HP
i LY  is the 1966 value of the HP trend computed using data from 1960 to 1966, 
and so on. Thus, the sample over which the trend is computed expands by one year as 
each successive year in the sample is added. GVL compute all these trends setting the HP 
smoothing parameter to 1000.
 19 
 
GVL identify a country to have experienced a credit boom when one or more 
contiguous dates satisfy the following condition:  () () () ,, , // /
EHP EHP
it it it LY LY LY φ ⎡⎤ − ≥ ⎣⎦
 . 
That is, the deviation from the expanding trend in the credit-GDP ratio must be at least as 
large as a boom threshold φ  .
20 The peak of the credit boom occurs on the date within the 
set included in the credit boom that shows the largest deviation from the expanding HP 
trend, and the starting (ending) date is the date earlier (later) than the peak date at which 
the credit-GDP ratio is higher (lower) than a “limit threshold.”
21 GVL conduct their event 
analysis using φ  =19.5 percent and a limit threshold of 5 percent. 
 
                                                 
18 Since credit is a stock variable, GVL proxy Yit as the geometric average of nominal GDP in t and t+1. 
19 GVL justify the expanding trend by arguing that it reflects the credit information available to 
policymakers at a given time. As our comparison of the two methods showed, however, the expanding 
trend yields a trend process that is close to a smoothed, one-period lagged transformation of the original 
credit series, suggesting that the policymaker would tend to misinterpret the most recent credit observations 
as part of a trend rather than a boom. Moreover, the credit data themselves are frequently revised, making 
the expanding trend difficult to justify on the basis of representing the information available to 
policymakers. 
20 GVL refer to this threshold as the “relative deviation threshold.” They also measured credit booms using 
an “absolute deviation threshold,” which measures credit booms relative to the size of the economy instead 
of the relative size of the banking sector. Their macro event analysis is based on the relative threshold. 
21 Notice that this limit threshold does not correct for the discrete nature of the data, as we did in our 



























































































































































































































3Figure 2. Relative Credit Booms
(Deviation from trend at peak of credit boom as a ratio of the std deviation of credit)



















































































































1/ Ongoing credit booms are shown in green.Figure 4. Credit Booms in Chile: the Mendoza-Terrones Method
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Panel 1 Panel 2
Panel 3 Panel 4Figure 5. Credit Booms in Chile: the Gourinchas, Valdes, and 
Landerretche (GVL) Method
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Panel 1 Panel 2
Panel 3 Panel 4Figure 6. Credit Booms in Chile: Expanding 
vs. Conventional Trend












































































































































































































































































sFigure 8. Credit Booms and Domestic Demand
























































































-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Industrial Countries Emerging EconomiesFigure 9. Credit Booms and the Non-tradables Sector
(Cross-country means and medians of cyclical components)
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Real Exchange Rate (RER)
Industrial Countries Emerging EconomiesFigure 10. Credit Booms, Current Account, and Capital Inflows
(Cross-country means and medians of cyclical component)
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Emerging Economies Industrial CountriesFigure 11. Credit Booms and Prices
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Industrial CountriesFigure 12. Credit Booms: Corporate Leverage
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Industrial 
Countries
Emerging MarketsFigure 15. Credit Booms: Financial Indicators
Regional Differences
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- 3 - 2 - 10123Figure 16. Credit Booms: Corporate Leverage and External
Financing in Emerging Market Countries






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nTable 2.  Coincidence of  Credit Booms with









Output 0.56 0.32 0.45
Non-tradable Output 0.33 0.55 0.43
Consumption 0.56 0.36 0.47
Investment 0.59 0.55 0.57
Government Expenditures 0.33 0.41 0.37
1/  The figures reported in this Table are fractions of credit booms that coincide 
with output/demand boom, within the seven-year window of the credit boom. 
The output/demand boom has been determined using a similar method to the one























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Large Capital Inflows  (A) 
2/ 0.27 0.50 0.52
Significant Productivity Gains (B) 
3/ 0.40 0.17 0.33
Large Financial Sector Changes  (C ) 
4/ 0.33 0.22 0.27
Other 0.27 0.39 0.30
Memo items:
(A) & (B) 0.07 0.00 0.09
(A) & (C ) 0.00 0.06 0.12
(B) & (C ) 0.07 0.11 0.09
(A) & (B) & (C ) 0.07 0.06 0.06
1/  Because of data availability we have used the 1975-2005 period only.
2/ The three-year average of capital inflow before the peak of the boom ranks in the top quartile of
their corresponding country group.
3/ The three-year average of the annual growth rate of TFP before the peak of the boom ranks in the
top quartile of their corresponding country group.
4/ The three-year change before the peak of the boom in the financial reform index ranks in the top
quartile of their corresponding country group.









1/ 77.78 73.91 76.00
Dirty Floating
2/ 7.41 17.39 12.00
Floating
3/ 7.41 0.00 4.00
Mixed 7.41 8.70 8.00
3/ Freely floating regimes from the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification.
1/ Fixed and managed includes the following regimes from the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification: no separate 
legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/- 2%, de facto peg, pre-announced crawling peg, pre-announced crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2%, de facto crawling peg, and de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%.
2/ Dirty floating includes the following regimes from the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification: pre-announced 
crawling band wider than or equal to +/-2%, de facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-5%, moving 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%, and managed floating.